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1 
APPLYING THE FERES DOCTRINE TO PRENATAL INJURY 
CASES AFTER ORTIZ V. UNITED STATES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An army hospital’s medical staff negligently injured the child of an 
army officer during the child’s birth. In a subsequent medical malprac-
tice suit, the district court and the Tenth Circuit applied the Feres doc-
trine to prevent recovery.1 That doctrine prevents active duty military 
servicepersons from bringing tort claims against the government, but 
some courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have construed it to also block 
relief for a serviceperson’s child. Typically, the civilian children of mili-
tary servicemembers can bring medical malpractice claims against gov-
ernment actors under the Federal Tort Claims Act2 (FTCA). However, 
when reviewing cases of prenatal injury, some courts find the connection 
between child and servicemember mother bring these claims within the 
purview of the Feres doctrine.3 Applying the “genesis test,” these courts 
hold Feres bars the prenatal injury claims because the harm, although to 
the child, is nonetheless “incident to the service” of the mother.4 The 
Tenth Circuit followed that line of reasoning in Ortiz v. United States.5  
Ortiz presents “an important question of federal law that has not 
been, but should be, settled by [the Supreme] Court”6: whether third par-
ty civilians receiving injuries in utero caused by the negligence of mili-
tary medical personnel should be permitted to seek relief under the 
FTCA.7 Because the Supreme Court has never ruled on a prenatal injury 
Feres case, there is little uniformity in how lower courts apply the Feres 
doctrine to those cases. Most circuits apply some version of the genesis 
test, but the variations of that test result in significantly different out-
comes for plaintiffs.8 Whether a court considers (1) the focus of medical 
treatment, (2) the inception of the injury, or (3) the conduct of the mother 
when she suffered injury affects whether a child’s prenatal injury is 
barred by Feres. This Comment argues the Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari to review Ortiz and resolve the split among the circuit courts on 
  
 1. Ortiz v. United States Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 819 (10th Cir. 2015), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 15-488). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671–80 (2012). 
 3. Ortiz v. United States, 786 F.3d 817 (2015); Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 873 
(9th Cir. 2013); Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988); Scales v. United States 685 
F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 4. Ortiz v. United States Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., No. 12-CV-01731-PAB-KMT, 2013 WL 
5446057, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2013). 
 5. Id. 
 6. U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). 
 7. Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 818.  
 8. See infra Part III. 
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how to apply the Feres doctrine to prenatal injury claims. The Court 
should reject use of any version of the genesis test in prenatal injury cas-
es and adopt a compensation-focused test consistent with the issues cen-
tral to the Stencel Aero holding—the Court’s premier case on third party 
Feres claims.9  
Despite the arguments here that the Court should review Ortiz, it is 
unlikely to do so considering its denial of the petition for certiorari in the 
recent Feres case Witt v. United States,10 and previous prenatal injury 
cases Scales,11 Irvin,12 and Minns.13 Regardless of whether the Court 
grants certiorari in Ortiz, Congress should amend the FTCA to permit all 
medical malpractice claims, or at least those alleging injuries resulting 
from negligent prenatal care. If Congress does not amend the FTCA, it 
should create a benefit program for children suffering injuries from neg-
ligent prenatal care like that established for children of Vietnam veterans 
born with spina bifida and other birth defects.14 If the Court denies certi-
orari in Ortiz or grants certiorari and upholds the case, action by Con-
gress is even more critical. 
To aid the argument that courts use a compensation-focused test in 
negligent prenatal care cases, Part II reviews the development of the 
Feres doctrine. Part III tracks the development of the genesis test from 
its beginning to its recent application by the Tenth Circuit in Ortiz. 
Part IV summarizes the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Ortiz. Part V critiques 
Ortiz and suggests the compensation-focused framework the Supreme 
Court should adopt for analyzing prenatal injury claims under Feres if it 
grants certiorari in Ortiz. Part VI calls Congress to amend the FTCA or 
create a benefit program for children suffering prenatal injuries. 
II. THE FTCA AND THE FERES DOCTRINE 
In 1946, Congress enacted the FTCA,15 a waiver of the federal gov-
ernment’s sovereign immunity making the United States “liable . . . in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances” for most torts committed by people acting on its behalf.16 
In the 1950 case Feres v. United States,17 the U.S. Supreme Court inter-
preted an exception to that broad waiver of immunity for members of the 
armed services, holding the FTCA does not create a right of action for 
  
 9. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
 10. Witt ex rel. Estate of Witt v. United States, 379 Fed.Appx. 559 (9th Cir. 2010), cert de-
nied, 131 S. Ct. 3058 (2011). 
 11. Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983). 
 12. Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 875 (1988). 
 13. Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 1998), cert denied 525 U.S. 1106 (1999). 
 14. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1802–05, 1811–16 (2012). 
 15. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671–80 (2012). 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
 17. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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“injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course 
of activity incident to service.”18  
The Court gave two reasons for its holding. First, the “distinctively 
federal” nature of the relationship between the government and its mili-
tary members—a relationship governed exclusively by federal sources 
and authority—suggests Congress did not intend to disrupt that relation-
ship through the FTCA.19 Further, the Court noted that the FTCA only 
confers liability on the government where a private individual would be 
held liable “under like circumstances,”20 and no state law permits a mili-
tary member to sue “his superior officers or the government he is serv-
ing” for negligence. Therefore, the Court held the FTCA cannot be read 
to create such a “novel and unprecedented liabilit[y].”21 Second, the 
Court saw the existence of uniform compensation schemes for injured 
servicemembers, like the Veterans Benefit Act (VBA), as evidence Con-
gress did not intend for the FTCA to apply in the military setting.22 Had 
Congress contemplated servicemembers when it drafted the FTCA, the 
Court reasoned, it would have had to explain whether they could collect 
both statutory and FTCA remedies or just one, but the FTCA is silent on 
the matter.23  
Over time, the two reasons the Court listed for its holding in Feres 
evolved into three rationales: “(1) the distinctly federal nature of the rela-
tionship between government and members of its armed forces; (2) the 
availability of alternative compensation systems; and (3) the fear of dam-
  
 18. Id. at 146. Since it was decided, Feres has been regularly admonished in law review 
articles and applied by courts in agony. Ortiz v. United States Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 
817, 818 (10th Cir. 2015) (“the facts here exemplify the overbreadth (and unfairness) of the doctrine, 
but Feres is not ours to overrule”); e.g. Patrick J. Austin, Incident to Service: Analysis of the Feres 
Doctrine and its Overly Broad Application to Service Members Inured by Negligent Acts Beyond the 
Battlefield, 14 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1 (2014). The dissent in United States v. Johnson gives a cogent 
explanation of the doctrinal concerns with the opinion, namely the lack of textual support in the 
FTCA for its holding. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 699–703 (1987). And as numerous as 
the arguments to overturn Feres are those suggesting medical malpractice lawsuits in particular 
should be excepted from the Feres bar. E.g. John B. Wells, Providing Relief to the Victims of Mili-
tary Medicine: A New Challenge to the Application of the Feres Doctrine in Military Medical Mal-
practice Cases, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 109 (1993); Keith B. Sieczkowski, Service Member Recovery for 
Military Medical Malpractice Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Judicial Response, 19 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 203 (1987); Jennifer L. Carpenter, Military Medical Malpractice: Adopt the Discre-
tionary Function Exception as an Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 35 (2003). 
Even Congress has attempted to pass several bills to amend the FTCA to permit medical malpractice 
claims. E.g. H.R. 1161, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 3174, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 536, 101st Cong. 
(1989). This Article agrees that “Feres was wrongly decided” and the doctrine should, at least, 
except medical malpractice claims from its bar. But because those arguments have been laid out 
elsewhere and have been thus far ineffective, this Article proceeds from the posture that Feres and 
its application to medical malpractice claims will be good law for the foreseeable future. Johnson, 
481 U.S. at 700. 
 19. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.  
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
 21. 340 U.S. at 141–42. 
 22. Id. at 144. 
 23. Id.  
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aging the military disciplinary structure.”24 These three rationales be-
came known as the “Feres rationales,” “special factors,” or “Feres fac-
tors.” The Court applied all three rationales in some cases, but only the 
military discipline rationale in other cases.25 Most recently, in United 
States v. Johnson, the Court reaffirmed that all three factors should be 
considered in a Feres analysis.26  
III. THE GENESIS TEST 
The Court’s inconsistency in interpreting Feres is especially prob-
lematic for lower courts adjudicating prenatal injury cases because the 
fact patterns are substantially different from any Feres case the Court has 
decided. Feres analyzed two medical malpractice claims, and another 
Supreme Court case, Stencel Aero Engineering Inc. v. United States,27 
reviewed a third-party claim derivative of a servicemember’s claim, but 
neither court could have contemplated the unique physically-connected 
relationship between servicemember mother and in utero child. Faced 
with this novel circumstance and offered no guidance from the Court, 
lower courts developed their own doctrine: the genesis test. That test 
further evolved into three versions: (1) the treatment-focused approach, 
(2) the injury-focused approach, and (3) the conduct-focused approach. 
The circuit courts apply the genesis test as a way to determine if the pre-
natal injury is precluded by Feres, based on one or more of the Feres 
factors. Most circuits focus only on the military discipline factor, but 
some have applied all three factors consistent with Johnson and Stencel 
Aero.28 In Ortiz, the Tenth Circuit did not rely on any of the factors.29 
Eight cases are helpful in understanding how each version of the 
genesis test developed: 
(1) Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 
(1977). 
(2) Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981). 
(3) Scales v. United States 685 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1982). 
(4) Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988). 
  
 24. Ortiz v. United States Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 821 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 773 (10th Cir. 1988)).  
 25. The special factors were first articulated by the Court in Stencel Aero. 431 U.S. 666, 671–
72 (1977). Later, the Court noted that two of the three factors were “no longer controlling” and 
instead focused on the military discipline rationale. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 
(1985). Then in United States v. Johnson the Court reaffirmed that all three rationales should be 
considered. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 684 n.2 (1987). 
 26. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 684 n.2.  
 27. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
 28. Monaco, Scales, Irvin, Minns, Ritchie and Ortiz apply the genesis test to determine if the 
claim would undermine military discipline and decision-making; Romero and Brown apply the 
genesis test to determine if all three factors are implicated. 
 29. Ortiz, 796 F.3d at 822. 
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(5) Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1992). 
(6) Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2006). 
(7) Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 1998). 
(8) Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2013). 
The lower courts have done their best to apply Feres to negligent 
prenatal care cases given the case law at their disposal, but the results are 
inconsistent and in conflict with the holdings in the only two Supreme 
Court cases informative on the subject, Feres and Stencel Aero. 
A. The Birth of the Genesis Test 
The genesis test supposedly originates in Stencel Aero.30 In that 
case, a National Guard officer sued the private manufacturer of the ejec-
tion system of his fighter aircraft for injuries he suffered when the system 
malfunctioned during a midair emergency.31 The manufacturer cross-
claimed the United States, arguing any malfunction in the system was the 
result of poor design plans and components furnished by the govern-
ment.32 Applying all three Feres factors, the Court disallowed the private 
contractor from obtaining indemnification from the government, holding 
the same Feres principles that support barring the servicemember from 
suing the government for the injuries he suffered in the accident also 
support barring the manufacturer from recovering.33 First, the govern-
ment’s relationship with the manufacturer, a supplier of ordnance, was 
just as “distinctively federal” as the government’s relationship with its 
soldiers.34 Second, the injured serviceman was compensated under the 
VBA.35 The Court emphasized this point, holding for the first time that 
the “military compensation scheme provides an upper limit of liability 
for the government as to service-connected injuries.”36 Permitting peti-
tioner's claim would “circumvent this limitation,” because the govern-
ment would be paying twice for the same injury—once to the injured 
airman through the VBA and a second time to the manufacturer through 
a civil lawsuit.37 Finally, the claim would have the same effect on mili-
tary discipline as a suit brought by the soldier directly injured because 
the manufacturer was indemnifying the government’s for its fault in 
causing that exact injury. Circuit courts have extended Stencel Aero “be-
  
 30. Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 824 (“The analysis in Stencel Aero became what is now known as the 
‘genesis test.’”). 
 31. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 667–69. 
 32. Id. at 668–69. 
 33. Id. at 673–74. 
 34. Id. at 672.  
 35. Id. at 672–73. 
 36. Id. at 673. 
 37. Id. 
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yond the indemnity context, creating what is now known as ‘the genesis 
test.’”38  
In Monaco v. United States,39 the Ninth Circuit was the first appel-
late court to extend Stencel Aero to a prenatal injury case.40 In Monaco, 
the daughter of a serviceman was born with birth defects that resulted 
from her father’s exposure to gene-mutating radiation during his service 
before her conception.41 This birth defect induced brain hemorrhages, 
aphasia, and other permanent injuries.42 Focusing only on the military 
discipline factor, the Ninth Circuit found the daughter’s civilian status 
did not open the door to a tort claim because permitting her claim would 
require a jury to second guess the government’s choice to expose its ser-
vicemembers to radiation—the precise examination of military decision-
making Feres intended to prevent.43 Because “a court could not rule on 
[the daughter’s claim] without examining acts occurring while [the fa-
ther] was in the service,” Feres barred the claim.44 This reasoning, 
though a variation of the Stencel Aero holding, would become the gene-
sis test. 
B. Genesis Test in Negligent Prenatal Care Cases: Treatment, Conduct, 
or Injury Focus? 
1. Treatment-Focused Approach 
The Fifth Circuit was the first to apply the genesis test to negligent 
prenatal care. In Scales v. United States, Charles Scales brought an 
FTCA claim against the government because he was born with congeni-
tal rubella syndrome that he allegedly contracted from a rubella vaccine 
negligently administered to his mother by Air Force medical staff during 
the first trimester of her pregnancy.45 Citing Stencel and Monaco as au-
thority and focusing on the military discipline factor, the Fifth Circuit 
employed what would later become the “treatment-focused genesis 
test.”46 The court held the treatment accorded Charles’ mother was “in-
herently inseparable from the treatment accorded Charles as a fetus in his 
  
 38. Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 837 n.3. 
 39. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 40. Monaco is one case in a long line of “exposure” cases. Two exposure cases, Monaco and 
Minns, are helpful to understanding the development of the genesis test as it has been applied in 
negligent prenatal care cases. Negligent exposure cases present their own set of problems and have 
been discussed at length by other authors. Mia Donnelly, Fighting Feres: Creating a VA Benefits 
Program for the Children of Servicemembers Injured by Parental Exposure, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
647 (2015); Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. L. 
REV. 1 (2007). The framework for analysis suggested by this Article can apply to both negligent 
exposure cases and negligent prenatal care cases, but this Article focuses on the latter given the 
circuit court split induced by Ortiz.   
 41. Monaco at 130. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 133–34. 
 44. Id. at 134. 
 45. Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 46. Id. at 974. 
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mother's body.”47 Feres barred Scales’ claim for the same reasons under-
lying Monaco: just as permitting his Scales’ mother to sue the medical 
staff would undermine military decision-making, so too would permit-
ting Charles to bring a claim—his injuries resulted from the same vac-
cine administered to his mother.48  
The Sixth Circuit applied the same treatment-focused approach used 
in Scales in Irvin v. United States when it coined the term “genesis 
test.”49 In Irvin, a servicewoman and her husband sued the government 
for the death of their daughter four days after her birth, which allegedly 
resulted from a military hospital’s negligent prenatal diagnosis and 
care.50 The hospital cared for the mother as a routine patient instead of 
classifying her condition as “urgent” as her symptoms and medical histo-
ry suggested.51 Following Scales and Monaco and focusing on the mili-
tary discipline factor, the court held permitting the claims would place a 
trial court “in the position of questioning the propriety of decisions or 
conduct of fellow members of the Armed Forces[,] precisely the type of 
examination that Feres seeks to avoid.”52 Feres barred the claim because 
the treatment in question was afforded to the servicemember mother, as it 
was in Scales.53  
The Fourth Circuit applied the genesis test to a nearly identical fact 
pattern in Romero v. United States, but held Feres did not bar the 
claim.54 The court used the “sole purpose” test, a variation of the treat-
ment-focused approach.55 Like in Irvin, the injury in Romero stemmed 
from inadequate prenatal care that resulted from the medical staff ignor-
ing crucial medical history of the mother.56 Plaintiff parents, Roxanna 
and Clifford Romero, alleged the Naval doctors’ failure to implement a 
medical treatment plan for Roxanna, despite knowing about her congeni-
tal cervical weakness, resulted in their son, Joshua, being born with cere-
bral palsy.57 The court held Feres did not apply because the “sole pur-
pose” of the treatment—sutures over Roxanna’s cervix to prevent prema-
ture labor—would have been directed at Joshua and only served to pre-
vent him from injury.58 Additionally, the court found that application of 
  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126, 131 (6th Cir. 1988). The Irvin court cited several 
additional cases having used something like the “genesis” test, including Monaco v. United States, 
661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
and Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983).  
 50. Irvin, 845 F.2d at 127. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 131 (quoting Scales, 685 F.2d at 974) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53. Id. at 131. 
 54. Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223, 227 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 55. Id. at 225.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 224. 
 58. Id. at 225. 
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the three-factor Feres balancing test supported its decision to permit 
Joshua to bring the FTCA claim.59  
2. Injury-Focused Approach 
Eighteen years after its decision in Irvin, the Sixth Circuit faced a 
fact pattern analogous to Romero, but instead of applying the treatment-
focused genesis test that both Irvin and Romero used, the court recharac-
terized those precedents as standing for a focus on the genesis of the in-
jury.60 In Brown v. United States, Timothy Brown brought suit on behalf 
of his daughter Melody against the senior medical officer at a Navy clin-
ic who recommended Timothy’s wife, Deborah, stop taking her prenatal 
vitamins.61 Timothy alleged the doctor’s negligent prenatal treatment 
caused Melody to be born with spina bifida because she lacked sufficient 
folic acid during gestation.62 The Sixth Circuit found the facts analogous 
to Romero because, like the mother in that case who wasn’t “injured” by 
her cervical weakness, Deborah was not “injured” by having less than the 
recommended amount of folic acid in her system.63 The court held that 
Melody could bring a claim because, like the plaintiff in Romero, she 
suffered injury independent of any injury to her servicemember parent 
and, where negligent prenatal care affects only the health of the fetus, the 
three Feres rationales are simply inapplicable.64   
3. Conduct-Focused Approach 
Six years after its Romero decision, the Fourth Circuit took the gen-
esis test in a different direction in Minns v. United States, another pre-
conception exposure case.65 In Minns, wives and children of servicemen 
brought FTCA claims against the government on the theory that their 
husbands’ and fathers’ exposure to toxins and pesticides during military 
preparation caused a chromosomal change that led to birth defects in the 
children conceived after the exposure.66 The court applied a conduct-
focused genesis test that, like the tests used in Irvin, Scales, and Monaco, 
was chiefly concerned with the impact of the circumstances on military 
discipline.67 The court held the genesis test does not ask when and where 
the injury occurred, but “whether the [government’s] negligent act is the 
basis for the ‘type of claim that, if generally permitted, would involve the 
judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline 
and effectiveness.’”68 The court held that the “negligence in [administer-
  
 59. Id. 
 60. Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 612–13 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 61. Id. at 610–11. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 614–16. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 66. Id. at 447. 
 67. Id. at 450. 
 68. Id. 
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ing the exposure-program] to the servicemen thus was the ‘genesis’ and 
the ‘but for’ cause of the injuries to the wives and children,”69 and so the 
plaintiffs’ claims were the type of claim that would result in a civilian 
court second-guessing military decision-making.70 
In Ritchie v. United States, the Ninth Circuit was the last court to 
apply the genesis test to a prenatal injury case before Ortiz, and so con-
cludes the historical development of the test.71 In analyzing the case, the 
court emphasized its commitment to applying the injury-focused genesis 
test from Monaco and other Ninth Circuit precedent.72 That version of 
the test asks (1) whether the family member’s FTCA claim has its “gene-
sis in injuries to members of the armed forces” and, more especially, (2) 
whether entertaining the claim would cause a court to “examine the gov-
ernment’s activity in relation to military personnel on active duty.”73 In 
Ritchie, a civilian father brought an FTCA claim against the United 
States for loss of consortium and wrongful death.74 He alleged that offic-
ers in the U.S. Army caused his son’s death by ordering his pregnant 
wife, a servicewoman on active duty, to perform physical training that 
contradicted her doctors’ instructions.75 The physical activity induced 
premature labor that caused the son’s death thirty minutes after birth.76 
The plaintiff analogized the facts to Romero and Brown where the moth-
er’s “injury” was no injury at all, but the child suffered severe injury 
independently.77 The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s suggestion to 
adopt out-of-circuit “doctrinal contortions.”78 Instead, it applied its ver-
sion of the genesis test to hold the civilian father’s claim was barred by 
Feres because it asked the court to scrutinize orders given to his wife by 
her military supervisor—precisely the military decision-making Feres 
intended to protect.79   
The Tenth Circuit decided Ortiz in this sea of genesis tests.  
IV. ORTIZ V. UNITED STATES 
A. Facts 
In March 2009, Heather Ortiz, an active duty servicemember of the 
U.S. Air Force, checked into the Evans Army Community Hospital in 
Fort Carson, Colorado for a scheduled Caesarean section.80 Before the 
  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 72. Id. at 877. 
 73. Ritchie at 875–76. 
 74. Id. at 873. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 877. 
 78. Id. at 877–78.  
 79. Id. at 876–77. 
 80. Ortiz v. United States Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 819 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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procedure began, a nurse at the hospital gave Ortiz Zantac to prevent 
aspiration of gastric acid during labor or surgery.81 As clearly noted in 
her records, Ortiz is allergic to Zantac; she immediately reacted to the 
medication.82 Medical staff administered Benadryl to counteract the al-
lergy.83 But the Benadryl caused a sudden drop in Ortiz’s blood pressure 
that restricted blood flow to the uterus and placenta long enough to cause 
her child, I.O., to suffer severe brain trauma that caused cerebral palsy.84  
B. Procedural History 
I.O.’s father filed a lawsuit on her behalf against the United States 
in the federal district court, seeking compensation for I.O.’s injuries, 
long-term medical care, and life-care needs.85 The United States moved 
to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Feres doctrine.86 Applying several standards adopted in other circuits, 
the district court held that because “the harm to I.O. was incident to the 
service of her mother,” Feres barred plaintiff’s claims related to both (1) 
the negligent dispensation of Zantac and Benadryl, and (2) the negligent 
observation of fetal vital signs.87  
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision relying on 
Feres and Stencel Aero as primary authority.88 The court held the injury-
focused version of the genesis test is the appropriate analysis for Feres 
claims involving derivative third-party injuries, including those occurring 
in utero.89 Because I.O.’s injury derived from her mother’s injury—the 
drop in blood pressure—Feres barred I.O.’s claims. 
C. Majority Opinion 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, hold-
ing the Feres doctrine barred I.O.’s claims.90 Writing for the majority, 
Judge Timothy Tymkovich began by acknowledging that “the facts here 
exemplify the overbreadth (and unfairness) of the doctrine, but Feres is 
not [the Tenth Circuit’s] to overrule.”91  
First, the majority summarized the history of the Feres doctrine and 
its application in the Tenth Circuit.92 The court explained the “special 
factors,” and the recent focus by many courts on the third factor, the im-
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portance of preserving military disciplinary structure.93 However, the 
court clarified that the Tenth Circuit has “essentially rejected any focus 
on the special factors, finding them unduly redundant, and returned the 
analysis to the inquiry that Feres originally set forth: whether the injury 
was ‘incident to service.’”94  
Next, the court discussed the framework for “addressing claims as-
serted by civilian third parties that arise out of injuries to a servicemem-
ber.”95 The majority pointed to Stencel Aero as the case where the Su-
preme Court articulated the genesis test as the proper analysis for third 
party civilian injuries derivative from servicemember injuries.96 Relying 
on Stencel Aero, the majority announced its adoption of the genesis test 
for third party Feres claims involving derivative injuries, concluding that 
where a civilian injury has its origin in an incident-to-service injury to a 
service member, Feres will bar the claim.97 Then, the majority specified 
its preference for the injury-focused version of the genesis test.98 This 
version of the approach asks (1) whether there was an incident-to-service 
injury to the servicemember, and (2) whether the injury to the third party 
was derivative of that injury.99 A negative answer to either question 
overcomes the Feres jurisdictional bar.100 The court concluded that bind-
ing precedents, Feres and Stencel Aero, command adoption of the injury-
focused genesis test and rejection of a focus on the object of the negli-
gence or the target of the medical treatment approaches taken by other 
courts.101  
Finally, the majority explained why the injury-focused genesis test 
applies to in utero cases over a treatment or conduct-focused approach 
like that suggested by the concurrence.102 Other circuits have applied a 
treatment-focused genesis test, but that approach looks closer at the mer-
its than the jurisdictional Feres doctrine calls for.103 The majority empha-
sized that if Feres applies, the government is immune to lawsuits regard-
less of “the viability of plaintiff’s negligence or other tort claims.”104 A 
treatment-focused genesis test skips to questions of duty, breach, and 
causation when only two questions need be asked: Was a service mem-
ber injured? Did that injury cause a non-servicemember’s injuries?105 
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Applying the injury-focused genesis test to the facts in Ortiz, the 
majority concludes I.O.’s injury derived from her servicemember moth-
er’s injury.106 Particularly, in looking at the plaintiff’s complaint, the 
majority found plaintiff did not allege that Ortiz was not injured.107 In-
stead, the complaint references Ortiz’s “allergic reaction,” “blood pres-
sure problems,” and “hypotension”—evidence of factual injury, accord-
ing to the court.108 From there, it is a short logical step to hold I.O.’s ox-
ygen loss and subsequent brain trauma were the direct result of Ortiz’s 
drop in blood pressure.109 Because I.O.’s injuries derived from her ser-
vicemember mother’s injuries, her claims were barred by Feres.110 Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Government.111 
D. Concurring Opinion 
Judge David Ebel wrote separately to suggest a conduct-focused 
genesis test, instead of the majority’s injury-focused approach, to deter-
mine whether Feres bars a civilian’s claim for in utero injuries that arise 
out of the military’s provision of medical care to a servicemember moth-
er.112 The conduct-focused genesis test finds Feres bars a third party 
claim where the civilian child’s in utero injuries “flowed directly from 
the military’s immunized conduct toward its pregnant servicemem-
ber.”113 Judge Ebel argued that, by focusing on the immunity inquiry of 
the military’s conduct, the conduct-focused genesis test offers two ad-
vantages over the majority’s injury-focused test: (1) it better protects the 
“peculiar and special” relationship between the military and its service-
members, and (2) it comports with the Tenth Circuit’s front-loaded im-
munity inquiry in other contexts.114  
Further, Judge Ebel observed the conduct-focused genesis test is 
more consistent with the fundamental justifications for Feres: (1) the 
distinctly federal nature of the military’s relationship to its servicemem-
bers; (2) the availability of alternative compensation systems for injured 
servicemembers; and (3) the need to preserve the military disciplinary 
structure.115 In particular, the concurrence noticed the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the third rational—the realities of the military estab-
lishment as a “specialized community” and the importance of protecting 
the disciplinary structure—is at the heart of the Feres doctrine.116 Dam-
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ages actions brought by servicemembers clearly pose a danger of disrupt-
ing the military-servicemember relationship.117 Actions brought by third 
parties can pose this same danger.118 Judge Ebel argued that the conduct-
focused approach is the only genesis test that consistently and adequately 
protects the military-servicemember relationship because it evaluates the 
military’s conduct.119 If a certain kind of conduct falls under Feres im-
munity, that conduct will be immunized regardless of whom it affects.120   
V. ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Supreme Court should reverse Ortiz and reject the 
use of any version of the genesis test in prenatal injury cases. The Court 
should employ a compensation-focused test to analyze those cases. The 
genesis test must be rejected because it lacks doctrinal support and pro-
motes arbitrary line-drawing that defies basic tort principles. First, the 
genesis test lacks doctrinal support because it is inconsistent with Stencel 
Aero, the case courts rely on to justify using the test in negligent prenatal 
care cases.121 The holding in Stencel Aero turns on an application of all 
three Feres factors with an emphasis on the government’s statutory limit 
of liability, and explicitly prevents only third party claims that derive 
from the same servicemember’s injury, not claims that derive from an 
injury to the third party themselves.122 Further, the genesis test does not 
effectuate its often-stated purpose to eliminate claims that would call into 
question military decision-making; it eliminates some of these claims 
while permitting others.123 Second, as it is applied in prenatal injury cas-
es, the genesis test contradicts the basic tort principle of causation.124 The 
government is let off the hook for causing an injury to a civilian, a per-
son outside the class of persons the Feres doctrine prohibits from bring-
ing claims.125 
The Court should require that lower courts analyze in utero injuries 
by focusing on the issues central to the Stencel Aero holding: (1) whether 
a military servicemember suffered injury incident to military service; (2) 
whether they or a third party can recover under the VBA or a similar 
compensatory scheme for that injury; and if so, (3) whether a third party 
is attempting to recover damages for the same injury for which the gov-
ernment must already compensate the servicemember or a third party. 
Put simply, Is the government being asked to pay twice for the same in-
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jury? If so, the claim is barred by Feres; if not, the claim survives sum-
mary judgment. A compensation-focused analysis is supported by Sten-
cel Aero and holds the government liable for injuries it causes consistent 
with ordinary tort principles. In addition to its doctrinal consistency, this 
test will be relatively easy for lower courts to apply. Further, it will en-
courage Congress to amend the FTCA to permit more claims or compen-
sate plaintiffs more often under the VBA. Without amendment, the gov-
ernment will have to answer for its torts in civil court. The following 
comments apply to most prenatal care cases adopting some version of the 
genesis test, but they are couched in a critique of the Tenth Circuit’s ap-
plication of the genesis test in Ortiz. 
A. Court Should Reject the Genesis Test 
1. No Doctrinal Support  
First, the genesis test should be rejected because it lacks doctrinal 
support. Although it supposedly originates in Stencel Aero, the genesis 
test is inconsistent with that case because the Court’s holding to bar the 
third party manufacturer’s claim turned on an application of all three 
Feres factors with an emphasis on the government’s limit of liability set 
by the VBA.126 Further, the Court explicitly limited the Stencel Aero 
holding to prevent only third party claims deriving from injuries to ser-
vicemembers, not third party claims deriving from injuries to the third 
parties themselves.127 The genesis test also lacks doctrinal support be-
cause it does not eliminate all claims that might cause a trial court to 
second-guess military decision-making. 
Like most versions of the genesis test, the Tenth Circuit’s injury-
focused genesis test does not follow Stencel Aero’s analysis. In Ortiz, the 
court rejected reliance on any Feres factor and held that any injury find-
ing its genesis in a service member’s injury is an injury “incident to ser-
vice” that Feres bars from adjudication.128 Ortiz ignored the compensa-
tion emphasis of Stencel Aero. Stencel Aero held that “the military com-
pensation scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the government 
as to service-connected injuries.”129 The Court relied on that factor to 
conclude that even though the manufacturer could not be compensated 
under the VBA, the government was still not liable to pay twice for the 
same injury.130 In subsequent cases where the Court has applied Stencel 
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Aero, it has emphasized that major holding.131 Proponents of the doctrine 
might argue that, though not identical to a three-factor Feres analysis, the 
genesis test is still consistent with Stencel Aero’s holding. But without 
considering the availability of compensation, the genesis test bars claims 
that a three-factor analysis would permit. The genesis test ignores the 
central piece of the Stencel Aero approach.  
Further, Stencel Aero does not support the genesis test because the 
Court explicitly limits the holding to preventing third party claims that 
derive from an already-compensated-servicemember’s injury, not claims 
that derive from an injury to the third party themselves.132 The Tenth 
Circuit’s derivative-injury focus ignores this limitation. Consider how 
the Stencel Aero Court might have decided the case if it involved a de-
rivative injury. Imagine the third party was a civilian bystander injured 
by a falling piece of debris while witnessing Captain Donham’s midair 
emergency. Suppose the plane was manufactured entirely by the Air 
Force and evidence showed the injuries to both the Captain and the by-
stander were caused by the government’s negligence. The Captain’s 
claims would be barred as they were in Stencel Aero. But applying each 
of the three factors, it is likely the Stencel Aero Court would have permit-
ted the civilian bystander to recover. In this hypothetical case, certainly 
the relationship between the government and the bystander was not “dis-
tinctively federal in character”133 as was the relationship between the 
government and its supplier of ordnance. Nor would the bystander be 
privy to a military compensation scheme like the Captain. The third fac-
tor—whether the claim would cause a trial court to second-guess military 
orders—is a closer call. However, the Court determined that “where the 
case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on duty, the effect of 
the action upon military discipline is identical whether the suit is brought 
by the solider directly or by a third party.”134 Here, it seems the Court 
means that whether the soldier is demanding a trial court examine the 
actions leading to his injuries or a third party is demanding a trial court 
examine the actions leading to the soldier’s injuries, the inquiry is the 
same and undermines military orders. The case of the bystander is differ-
ent. His case would not concern the injury of a soldier on duty, but his 
own injuries. The Stencel Aero Court stated the implications of its hold-
ing explicitly: “[T]he right of a third party to recover in an indemnity 
action against the United States recognized in Yellow Cab, must be held 
limited by the rationale of Feres where the injured party is a service-
man.”135 The case does not similarly limit claims where the government 
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also injures a civilian. Applying all three factors, it seems the Court 
would have permitted a bystander’s claim for a derivative injury under 
Feres. In Ortiz, I.O. is situated like the bystander.136 Her claims did not 
concern her mother’s injuries, but her own injuries.137 The Stencel Aero 
holding can be reasonably read to permit I.O.’s claims. 
Finally, the genesis test lacks doctrinal support because, as the 
Court applies it in prenatal injury cases, it does not eliminate all claims 
that might cause a trial court to second-guess military decision-making. 
The genesis test still permits litigation by third parties where the “issue 
would be the degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Government’s 
agents and the effect upon the serviceman’s safety.”138 For example, 
courts have permitted litigants to bring FTCA claims on behalf of babies 
injured just after birth or during birth if the injury is “direct” and inde-
pendent from an injury to their mother.139 It is difficult to see how adju-
dication of these claims would not “take virtually the identical form” as 
claims by in utero children.140 If the goal of courts applying the genesis 
test in prenatal injury cases is to prevent second-guessing of military 
decision-making, they are only addressing a portion of the cases they 
fear. 
2. Violates Tort Principles 
Second, the genesis test should be rejected because, when applied in 
negligent prenatal care cases, it consistently violates basic tort principles. 
In every case surveyed above applying the test, the government’s con-
duct was the but-for cause of the civilian child’s injury.141 No other actor 
or superseding intervening cause played a role. Yet, the children cannot 
recover. The genesis test punishes these civilian children for when they 
suffered injury—if the government causes the injury to the child in the 
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womb, the child cannot recover; if the government causes the injury to 
the child out of the womb, the child can recover. In both cases, the child 
is a civilian—a person outside the class of persons the Feres doctrine 
aims to prevent from suing under the FTCA—and the government 
caused the injury. In many cases, the mother also received an injury due 
to negligence of the medical staff, but that additional injury caused by 
the government does not change the causation analysis for the child’s 
injury nor eliminate the government’s responsibility to the non-
servicemember child. The government is immune as to the servicemem-
ber’s injury, yes, but it is not immune as to the civilian child’s injury. 
This irrational framework not only leaves civilian children and their fam-
ilies without compensation, but also threatens the legal system by creat-
ing a loophole for future tortfeasors.  
The Tenth Circuit addresses this issue in Ortiz. The court admits the 
military medical personnel caused I.O.’s injuries.142 But the court stresses 
“[t]he Feres doctrine has always operated as an antecedent jurisdictional 
hurdle” that may bar plaintiffs’ suits regardless of whether they have 
established a “prima facie tort against the government.”143 This concept 
isn’t striking in Feres cases where a servicemember is the only person 
injured, or where a civilian family member brings a wrongful death claim 
for their servicemember killed during combatant activities because Feres 
stands for the principle that the government is immune from liability for 
torts to servicemembers.144 The concept is shocking in prenatal injury 
cases where the government is the but-for cause of the harm to the civil-
ian child but refuses to answer for its negligence regardless. Neither 
Feres nor Stencel Aero stands for the principle that the government is 
immune from compensating civilian dependents of servicemembers for 
injuries it causes.145 In fact, the government has answered time and again 
for its torts committed against civilian dependents.146  
Again, applied in these cases the genesis test punishes civilian chil-
dren for when they suffered injury rather than assessing liability based on 
who suffered injury. The Tenth Circuit’s argument that it doesn’t matter 
whether a plaintiff has a prima facie case against the government makes 
sense when applied to servicemembers clearly excluded by Feres from 
bringing FTCA claims, but it fails to find support from tort law when 
applied to civilians suffering their own injuries caused by the govern-
ment.  
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B. Compensation-Focused Test  
The Court should adopt a compensation-focused test to analyze pre-
natal injury claims. Such a test should focus on the issues central to Sten-
cel Aero, asking (1) whether a military servicemember suffered injury 
incident to military service, (2) whether they or a third party can recover 
under the VBA or a similar compensatory scheme for that injury, and if 
so, (3) whether a third party is attempting to recover damages for the 
same injury for which the government must already compensate the ser-
vicemember or a third party. If the government is being asked to pay 
twice for the same injury, the claim is barred by Feres.  
The test is consistent with Supreme Court precedent cases Feres 
and Stencel Aero because it includes the “incident to service test” and 
respects the “upper limit of liability” imposed by the VBA, but does not 
unnecessarily prevent civilians from properly bringing claims under the 
FTCA. Applied to Ortiz, the compensation-focused test would permit 
I.O. to bring her claims against the government because neither the se-
cond nor third prong is met. 
1. Foundations of Compensation-Focused Test  
The compensation-focused test is consistent with Feres, Stencel 
Aero, and the subsequent cases where the Court has applied Stencel 
Aero. Recall Feres holds the FTCA does not create a right of action for 
“injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course 
of activity incident to service.”147 Again, Stencel Aero, the Court’s prem-
ier case on third party Feres claims, held a third party’s claim was Feres 
barred because (1) the petitioner had a distinctly federal relationship with 
the government, (2) the petitioner’s claim would cause the government to 
pay twice to compensate the same injury, and (3) the claim would “take 
virtually the identical form” as a claim brought by the servicemember.148 
Stencel Aero also stands for the premise that “the military compensation 
scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the Government as to ser-
vice-connected injuries.”149 In subsequent cases where the Court has ap-
plied Stencel Aero, it has emphasized the case’s major holding “that the 
existence of an exclusive statutory compensation remedy negates tort 
liability.”150 It follows then, that where an exclusive statutory compensa-
tion remedy does not exist, the government may be liable for its torts. 
Combining the holdings from Feres and Stencel Aero, it makes sense to 
design a test for third party Feres claims that precludes recovery when a 
servicemember was injured incident to military service and someone has 
been compensated by statute. This formulation will preclude claims 
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brought by servicemembers for injuries for which they have been com-
pensated. It will prohibit wrongful death claims where the family mem-
ber has been compensated under the VBA, as was the case in Johnson.151 
It may preclude negligent exposure cases like Monaco if there is a statu-
tory remedy in place, but will permit exposure claims where there is no 
remedy. Finally, the compensation-focused test will permit negligent 
prenatal care claims until the government creates a benefit program for 
children suffering those injuries.  
2. Benefits of Compensation-Focused Test 
Not only is a compensation-focused analysis supported by Stencel 
Aero and Feres, but the test also holds the government responsible for 
injuries it causes consistent with tort liability and the FTCA. Feres was 
not decided to bar civilians from bringing claims under the FTCA; its 
holding aimed to bar servicemembers from bringing claims.152 The com-
pensation-focused test will permit civilians to bring FTCA claims against 
the government regardless of their relationship with the injured service-
member, whether by umbilical cord or supplier contract. Civilians will be 
permitted to recover so long as there is no statutory compensation avail-
able to them. The permissiveness of the test will encourage Congress to 
amend the FTCA to permit more claims, compensate plaintiffs for more 
injuries under the VBA, or create more benefit programs153 to avoid an-
swering for its torts in civil court.  
Additionally, a compensation-focused test will be easy for lower 
courts to apply. The first prong requires a military service member to 
have suffered an injury incident to military service—the same inquiry 
employed in the genesis test. Because lower courts have been liberal in 
defining injuries as “incident to service,” this prong will usually be 
met.154 Of course, where an injury is clearly not incident to military ser-
vice, the plaintiff can bring their claim. The second prong asks whether 
the injured servicemember or a third party can recover under the VBA or 
a similar compensatory scheme for the injury. Parties can easily demon-
strate to the court whether compensation is available by pointing to the 
statute on point or its nonexistence. The third prong is likewise a simple 
inquiry: Is the third party seeking compensation for the same injury as 
the military member (like Stencel Aero), or for a separate injury? If the 
government has not paid for causing the injury, the claim is permitted, 
where the government has paid for causing the injury, the claim is not 
permitted.  
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3. Compensation-Focused Test Applied to Ortiz 
Applying the compensation-focused test to Ortiz, the first question 
is whether Ortiz suffered an injury incident to military service. The Tenth 
Circuit held she did.155 With Feres as precedent, servicemember injuries 
suffered in medical settings will almost always be incident to service. 
The second issue is whether Ortiz could recover for her injury under a 
compensation scheme. Although the case does not reach this question, it 
is likely the answer is “no.” Ortiz suffered “hypotension,” or a drop in 
blood pressure.156 For her, this is not a cognizable injury for which she 
could receive compensation because her blood pressure eventually re-
turned to normal levels leaving no trace of permanent damage. This 
would end the inquiry and permit I.O. to bring her tort claims. 
Even assuming Ortiz suffered an injury incident to service for 
which she could recover under the VBA, the third prong—whether a 
third party is attempting to recover damages for the same injury—is still 
not met. I.O. brought claims against the government for her own inju-
ries—the brain damage that led to cerebral palsy. This is a different inju-
ry to a different person that the government has not paid for. If the gov-
ernment compensated Ortiz for injuries related to her low blood pressure, 
that is of no consequence for I.O. She may still bring the claim. Whether 
or not Ortiz is considered to have a compensable injury, I.O. would be 
permitted to sue the government for the injuries she suffered due to the 
military hospital’s negligence.  
VI. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Regardless of whether the Court grants certiorari in Ortiz, Congress 
should amend the FTCA to permit all medical malpractice plaintiffs to 
bring suit, or at least those suffering prenatal injuries, or create a benefit 
program for children suffering injuries from negligent prenatal care. 
Congress has several times attempted to pass a bill excepting medi-
cal malpractice claims from the Feres jurisdictional bar.157 Most recently, 
Rep. Barney Frank in the 101st Congress (1989-90) introduced H.R. 536 
“[t]o amend chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, to allow claims 
against the United States under that chapter for damages arising from 
certain negligent medical care provided members of the Armed Forc-
es.”158 The bill passed in the House of Representatives via voice vote.159 
It was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Armed 
Services.160 The bill died in committee, never making it to the Senate 
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floor. H.R. 536 is a good model for the bill Congress should pass. It au-
thorizes the following: 
[Claims] for personal injury or death or a member of the Armed 
Forces in a medical facility operated by the Secretary of a military 
department or any other medical facility operated by the United 
States … [that] have arisen out of noncombatant medical or dental 
care furnished the member….161 
The bill also restricts claimants to recovering only one form of 
compensation. If claimants receive an award or judgment on a claim un-
der the amendment, they cannot collect an additional benefit from a stat-
utory compensation scheme. If they lose the lawsuit, they can collect the 
statutory benefit available. Alternatively, Congress could permit only 
medical malpractice claims from children suffering prenatal injuries due 
to negligence on the part of military medical personnel. This carve out 
may be more acceptable to members of Congress that opposed H.R. 536 
due to the servicemembers already receiving benefits through the VBA 
and those under the impression that “dependents of active duty personnel 
… may [always] sue the Government for malpractice at military medical 
facilities.”162 
If Congress does not amend the FTCA, it should create a benefit 
program for child victims of negligent prenatal care designed similarly to 
that established for children of Vietnam veterans born with spina bifida 
or other birth defects.163 That section of the VBA provides comprehen-
sive healthcare, rehabilitation, vocational training, and a monetary allow-
ance to children covered by the Act.164 The VBA could be similarly 
amended to include a section compensating child victims of negligent 
prenatal care. The new benefit program should include compensation for 
long-term medical care and life-care needs, as well as loss of consortium 
benefits to family members. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“The right a pregnant woman has to serve means little if her service 
requires she put her fetus’s health and well-being at risk.”165 The Su-
preme Court should grant certiorari to review Ortiz and resolve the split 
among the circuit courts about how the Feres doctrine applies in prenatal 
injury cases. The Court should reject any use of the genesis test in prena-
tal injury Feres cases in favor of a compensation-based test that permits 
recovery to third parties unless (1) a military servicemember suffered 
  
 161. 135 CONG. REC. H3224-01 (1989). 
 162. Id. (statement of Rep. Schiff that “the Government is already paying an amount to those 
people in the military who are injured through malpractice”); id. (statement of Rep. Byron). 
 163. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1802–05, 1811–16 (2012). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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injury incident to military service; (2) they or a third party can recover 
under the VBA or a similar compensatory scheme for that injury; and 
(3) a third party is attempting to recover damages for the same injury for 
which the government must already compensate the servicemember or a 
third party. Not only does this test better comport with the Supreme 
Court holdings in Feres and Stencel Aero, but it also promotes equity and 
would be easy for courts to apply. The test would hold the government 
liable for injuries it causes consistent with ordinary tort principles and 
encourage Congress to amend the FTCA or VBA to compensate people 
for more injuries.  
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